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The UK chief executive officer (CEO) of a large insurance firm
faced declining gross written premiums (revenue) in her
commercial division. In workshops, her senior managers
determined that their work came alive when they appeared
on emergency sites to distribute checks. She challenged
them, ‘‘Let’s treat customers that way all the time and sell
more.’’ When they wrote vague proposals to care for custo-
mers in sales, she hired consultants. Then she missed her
profit numbers; the Group CEO fired her. The consultants
continued on and executed her vision. She failed to exercise
political power, but did she fail in any of the basics Jeffrey
Pfeffer lists in his classic work on power? Did she fail to have a
compelling vision? to achieve buy-in? to detail the threat? to
have a good power map of the organization? to cultivate
relationships with allies and the Group CEO? She executed the
basics of power well. But she worked in a fearful organization
where managers instinctively shunned the limelight by point-
ing to others’ weaknesses. Her managers would casually let
slip that her plans might not save profitability. Those casual
slips silently became the Group CEO’s defining issue.
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS AND THE COMMON
FIX FOR NEGATIVE POLITICS
Everyone knows examples of mean-spirited, value-draining
company politics. Politics kills critical change programs, puts
managers into empty competition, and opens enormous fields
of reputation-covering busyness. We find that negative pol-
itics adds friction amounting to 20 percent of operating costs.
In their study, Philip Evans and Bob Wolf suggest the cost is
higher. Rosabeth Moss Kanter shows most managers believe
the fix involves replacing the leader and 70 percent of her
team. It works, but requires a new senior team unfamiliar
with the company.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2014.03.002
0090-2616/# 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is 
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).The 70 percent solution is not necessary. Leaders can turn
around the negative politics that grew up under them. The
change requires (1) realizing the importance of politics, (2)
knowing the foundation of the different kinds of politics in
structural moods (following Heidegger), (3) knowing the four
different kinds of negative and counterpart positive moods
and politics, and (4) deploying the basic building blocks for
change.
POLITICS AND ITS FOUNDATION
Can we simply just avoid politics? Pfeffer shows that politics
happen wherever wisdom is finite and people are interde-
pendent. With finite wisdom, reasons and facts are not
enough to compel commitment, and with interdependence,
commitment is necessary. Managers who use positive politics
invent decision-making processes, inspire, challenge, cajole,
improvise, horse trade, warn, corner, and reprove. Negative
politics adds blame, betrayal, appeasement, and deceit.
Senior managers cannot simply choose their company’s
politics. Politics is the visible expression of a larger emo-
tional-normative context, determining what matters. Where
hope matters, managers at odds offer occasions for conver-
sion. Where resentment reigns, managers seek gotcha
moments. Normal change programs shift a few norms, not
what matters.
Heidegger on Moods as Mattering
The philosopher Martin Heidegger, who brought mood into
prominence in philosophy, offers three insights that help us
understand and change negative politics. First, he (1927)
pointed out that mood determined how things matter and
separated mattering from meaning. The neurologist Anthony
Damasio confirmed the distinction with patient studies that
show we think irresolutely about things unless we feel how
they matter. Barclays’ 2012 famous, fearful Wealth Manage-
ment unit shows how the distinction works. Things havean open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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tical norms for coping with them. The meaning of a report — a
detailed account of a situation — synthesizes reflection (is it
true?) and action (do we jump?). Barclays’ people knew
reports. But in fear cultures, reports matter, as they threa-
ten. Thus, when Andrew Tinny, Wealth Management chief
operating office (COO), saw the report saying Barclays had a
fear culture, he hid it.
Moods also powerfully co-opt any theoretical or practical
norms that could change what matters. Sticking with fearful
organizations, Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries and Danny Miller
discovered that their managers generally report vaguely. To
change this, a unit manager relentlessly probed junior man-
agers for clarity. Her managers learned to write about spe-
cifics but conditioned them like lawyers. The manager
stopped the vagueness, but fear co-opted the new precision.
Heidegger on Structural Moods
Second, Heidegger (1930) went on to show that pervasive
moods only sometimes well up into noticeable feeling states
and usually arise out of normative social structures. We call
such moods structural moods. Most practice theorists mix
them up with other enduring dispositions.
What is a mood in the norms? Consider a cathedral.
Regardless of belief, most who enter a cathedral find them-
selves drawn to look up with awe and lower their voices
respectfully. They become reverential. Market structures
work the same way. Consider bubbles. Everything is a buying
opportunity; good economic reasons show growth will last
forever; naysayers are ignored. We dwell in the structural
mood that behavioral economists George Akerlof and Robert
Schiller call confidence; only claims bespeaking confidence
matter. Like Andrew Tinny, we can think beyond such moods,
but cannot stick to resolutions we form.
Company moods are harder to see. When we first enter a
company, we might notice a particular mood: the trusting
directness of people at the biotech or the fearful evasiveness
at the insurance company. But the awareness dies as the
mood possesses us. Fortunately, the number of common
moods is small. In applying Heidegger over the last 25 years
at well over 150 large and small companies in the Americas
and Europe, we find that most are in one of four negative or
positive moods: resentment, fear, resignation and arrogance,
and, as counterparts, hope, admiration, zeal and joy. Kets de
Vries and Miller found four organizational fantasies: schizoid,
paranoid, depressive, and dramatic, which correspond to our
four negative moods.
Kets de Vries and Miller as well as Jeffrey D. Ford, Laurie
W. Ford, Randall McNamara and Fernando Flores explain why
moods are most visible in organizational politics. Consider
what people naturally do in each mood: Resentment blames.
Hope trusts. Fear hides out and slights others. Admiration
celebrates. Resignation appeases. Zeal seeks a discipline.
Arrogance deceives to win. Joy improvises playfully.
Heidegger on Counter-Moods or Counterpart
Moods
Heidegger’s third insight (1927) shows how to get from one
mood to another: ‘‘When we master a mood, we do so by way ofa counter-mood.’’ As we saw, changing practices alone does
not change mattering. Only a second mood masters the first. In
applying this thought, we follow Charles Spinosa’s early
research and subsequent development by esthetic theorist
Jonathan Flatley and philosophers Hubert L. Dreyfus and Sean
Kelly. They found that it was easier to move to a mood that
played a subordinate role in the dominant mood. We call such
moods counterpart moods. Thus, while resentment disdains
other moods, it retains a hope of overcoming the enemy. As we
show later, building on that hope can drive the transformation.
Likewise, fear grudgingly admires the threatening. Resigned
managers are zealous about what cannot be changed. Arro-
gance contains a solitary joy in mastering others.
FOUR NEGATIVE STRUCTURAL MOODS AND
THEIR POSITIVE COUNTERPARTS
Since the structural mood is invisible to the leader, she
uncovers it by identifying the prevalent political practices
and then inferring which mood would incite them. To uncover
the political practices, ask: How does one get ahead? How do
we report up? How do we reach agreement? How do most
initiatives go? Most companies fall into one of the moods
listed below.
Resentment and the Politics of Blame
(Republicans vs. Democrats)
Resentment appears most commonly in partnerships and
research or advisory companies like biotechs or consultan-
cies. But Hewlett-Packard Co. famously fell into resentment
when Carly Fiorina fought with Walter Hewlett. Likewise, in
2011, TIME’s CEO Jack Giffin failed to overcome the resentful
skirmishing of editorial and advertising. In resentment, two
or more groups blame each other for corporate failures. They
spin each other’s statements to turn priority differences into
blameworthy malfeasance. Key moments in the company’s
history consist of out-groups replacing in-groups. Managers
spend time plotting to oust or convert other managers. Cross-
faction initiatives stall.
At a US medical services company that manages and staffs
hospital departments, the physicians, organized as partners,
characterized their culture as collegial. Their historical
behavior, however, revealed that leadership changes came
from Machiavellian conspiracies. Clever political maneuver-
ing put Martin, the CEO, and his chief business development
officer (CBDO) in place. They pursued growth through acqui-
sitions. A large minority faction on the board and Martin’s
COO believed that Martin and the CBDO were putting the
partnership culture at risk with acquisitions that were far-
flung, practiced lower quality medicine, or were otherwise
culturally unsuited. This faction spun every decision Martin
made into a self-interested act. As the board faction argued
against most acquisitions, Martin jeopardized his growth
strategy by making only the least controversial acquisitions.
Counterpart: Hope and the Politics of Trust
The politics of hope is trust-building: managers curry each
other’s good will with frank directness. Successful partnerships
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W. L. Gore and Associates, the producer of Gore fibers, has a
hope culture. With little hierarchy, associates are members
of inter-disciplinary teams. Leaders emerge according to the
needs of the team’s particular project. Managers disagree
directly and meet to see if they can persuade each other.
These companies have no long-standing factions. The history
of such companies focuses on legendary exploits of teams,
not coups. Though such organizations are intellectually
aggressive, controversial initiatives progress when the man-
agers use specific, trust-building processes to resolve dis-
agreements.
A biotech riven by factions showed it had made the
transformation to hope and trust when it started following
a rule that opponents had to meet and show that they had
mastered each other’s reasons. In a notable conversation,
the lead business developer said to the COO: ‘‘I think you are
wrong to oppose renting out our manufacturing capacity. I’ll
start by giving the best reasons I can for your view.’’ Shortly
after the business developer started giving reasons, he said,
‘‘I get it. I’m a convert.’’ He adopted the COO’s view.
Fear and the Politics of Betrayal (Communist East
Germany)
Unlike the fierce, articulate partisanship of resentment,
fear drives vague speech and isolation. Insurance, retail
banking, and media tend toward fear. Under John Birt,
the BBC in the 1990s fell into fear. Its managers pointed
to the faults in other divisions to keep attention from
themselves and casually betrayed each other. As in the
anecdote at the beginning of this article, conversations in
fear are littered with little betrayals: ‘‘Her management
style will paralyze her unit.’’ Reports remain high-level,
indulge in RAG (red, amber, green) signaling systems, and
do not bring out unresolved problems or provide a picture of
the experience on the ground. Junior managers weave
cocoons around upper managers, who see their own
hands-off management as the mark of their senior positions.
Managers take little ownership. They float trial balloons.
Fearful companies have many initiatives that start with clear
purposes, yield vague reports that lose senior management
interest, and then go dormant.
Counterpart: Admiration and the Politics of
Celebration
Fear grudgingly admires whatever threatens; thus, admira-
tion is fear’s counterpart. Rajendra Sissodia, David Wolfe,
and Jagdish Sheth write about admiration companies. They
compete on customer service: Harley-Davidson, JetBlue, LL
Bean, Patagonia, Trader Joe’s, and Whole Foods. Add Ump-
qua Bank, Starbucks, The Ritz-Carlton, John Lewis, Nord-
strom, and Disney. Like fear, admiration is indirect.
Initiatives begin when a manager notices an employee doing
something admirable such as making follow-up calls to cus-
tomers. The manager first entices others to celebrate the
action, then incites the performance by, for instance, offer-
ing call training, and last implements a measuring system and
standard celebration. These companies run on large and
small celebrations focusing on service values. Umpqua Bankhas Oscars-like celebrations. Starbucks’ employees share
service stories and virtuous service cards weekly.
Resignation and the Politics of Appeasement
(Trapped in a small town with the same people
forever)
Resignation is the classic structural mood of bureaucracies.
Manufacturing, engineering, pharmaceutical companies, uti-
lities, and government organizations easily fall prey. Facing
deregulation in the mid-1980s, The Bank of America faced so
much appeasing to maintain cordial relations that its senior
managers could not agree to sell the corporate jet. Innova-
tive Nokia, with 50 percent mobile market share in 2007, sold
its mobile business to Microsoft in 2013 because marketing,
software, and hardware managers were paralyzed in appeas-
ing each other. Resignation disposes managers to assume that
people in other departments will never change. Appeasing
them achieves consent. A European utility company provides
the classic case of how initiatives grow and fail in resignation.
The COO convened a customer service team to solve custo-
mer churn. When the team showed promising results with
green loyalty programs, the COO sought to broaden buy-in by
adding managers from generation, finance, and marketing.
Suspicious of the green angle, the new members asked for
more research. To appease them, the team proposed a
comprehensive research initiative. The COO funded a less
costly alternative but it did not appease. When the team
sought the costly plan again, the COO ended the project.
Counterpart: Zeal and the Politics of Discipline
While resignation has no joy, hope, or admiration, resigned
managers zealously believe that others will not change.
Thus, zeal can overcome resignation. The standard-bearers
of the structural mood of zeal and the politics of discipline
are Abbot Labs, Toyota, 3M, General Electric Co., Berkshire
Hathaway, and all of Jim Collins’s great companies. Man-
agers in zealous companies attract allies by fierce devotion
to the one discipline. At Abbot Labs, every manager is
responsible for the return on his or her department’s invest-
ments. Managers have enormous leeway so long as they
maintain their ROI (return on investment). Other disciplines
arising from zeal are product development, as at 3M and
Google, investing strategies at Berkshire Hathaway, and
safety. Zeal and the politics of discipline cut through silos
with one language. When in the 1990s British Airways zeal-
ously devoted itself to getting business travelers to work
fresh, even the information technology (IT) department
contributed by developing paperless tickets. At zealous
companies, managers make personal, public promises to
senior managers. Speech is distinctly plain like Warren
Buffett’s annual reports. Initiatives succeed because
focused teams drive hard with clear indicators aligned to
the corporate discipline.
A resigned European utility transformed itself from res-
ignation to zeal by making safety its religion. Everyone was
his or her brother’s keeper. No guest could get half way up
stairs without hearing a request to hold on to the rail. Cars
were all always reverse-parked. Meetings began with a
homily to safety. Managers then enlarged safety to include
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as family.
Arrogance and the Politics of Deceit (North
Korea)
In arrogant cultures, managers do not spin-doctor, feed on
airy vagueness, or appease. They make bold, deceitful pro-
mises to garner resources, share resources with friends, deny
them to enemies, and then finesse away promise fulfillment.
Managers are master game players with style and flair. Recall
the London Whale. High-tech, automotive, and telecommu-
nications companies, venture capitalists, securities traders
and investment bankers fall into this mood. Enron and GM
before the government bailout were arrogant. Arrogant
deceitfulness usually extends to suppliers and customers.
Arrogant venture capitalists (VCs) promise entrepreneurs
flatteringly large sums on cunning terms that quickly give
VCs majority ownership. Frequently, managers consider
themselves so masterful that they admit past deceits. GM
managers bragged about how their GM nod of approval duped
the unsophisticated. Arrogant game players say they are data
driven, because data require interpretation on which players
feast by taking advantage of blind spots. Chris Argyris
describes Intel’s arrogant phase in the late 1990s. Though
CEO Andy Grove preached honesty and data-driven decisions,
the manipulation of data fostered a sense of superiority in his
managers. Executive vice president Frank Gill even shared
guidelines for manipulating Grove’s blind spots.
A US high-tech company shows how initiatives fare in
arrogant organizations. The senior service manager boldly
and deceitfully promised to roll out an expensive, risky, but
successfully piloted program for gaining industry leadership
in service. Once he received the budget, he made the pilot
manager a direct report and told her to concentrate on a few
quick wins. He then commissioned a study to compare the
risk, cost, and benefits of the quick wins to the whole pilot.
The quick wins won on risk and cost. A second study evaluated
whether the company required service leadership. Last, he
asked for an increase in the budget and insisted on the
leadership team reading both studies. As expected, the
leaders chose the low-cost and risk-quick wins.
Counterpart: Joy and the Politics of Theatrical
Improvisation
Managers in arrogant companies are too sophisticated to hope,
too proud to admire, and too clever to feel fundamentalist
zeal. But they do feel solitary joy over their successes. Leaders
draw on this joy to move from the politics of deceit to joy’s
politics of theatrical improvisation. The game-playing
remains, but in joy, the group takes care of itself. Twitter
CEO Dick Costolo, who studied comic improvisation, puts it at
the heart of his company. Improv requires accepting collea-
gues’ initiations; Costolo insists on the same with employees.
Claudio Ciborra shows that elite firefighters succeed when they
joyfully improvise and fail when they decline an initiation.
At a joyful telecom, the board told a country manager in a
public meeting to take an hour and turn a carefully developed
$80 million plan into a $100 million plan. The country man-
ager played along happily because she knew that if sheshowed a little ingenuity, a board member would pick up
where she fell short. In joy, managers take up colleagues’
initiations and frequently do so in their colleague’s manner.
Handoffs are seamless. Initiatives succeed as managers
anticipate what their colleagues will need and supply it just
in time.
TRANSFORMING STRUCTURAL MOODS
How do leaders transform negative structural moods into their
counterparts? In 1884, philosopher William James wrote: ‘‘[I]f
we wish to conquer undesirable emotional tendencies in our-
selves, we must assiduously, and in the first instance cold-
bloodedly, go through the outward motions of those contrary
dispositions we prefer.’’ The principle is the same with struc-
tural moods, but the application harder. It feels more unna-
tural to change a structural mood than ordinary moods.
Transforming a structural mood and its politics requires assem-
bling three building blocks to overcome challenges that con-
found both James’s advice and that of today’s rationalistic
change methodologies like John Kotter’s or even the
experienced-based approach of Roger Connors and Tom Smith.
First, the negative structural mood and politics are mostly
invisible. To see reasons for change, managers have to get into
the counterpart mood and then observe their political beha-
vior. No study will do. Second, since the leader is in the
negative mood, he must change his own sense of mattering
— why he gets up in the morning — and visibly manage in the
new mood. Third, following such practice-based theorists as
Jo¨rgen Sandberg and Haridimos Tsoukas, Tamara Erickson and
Lynda Gratton, and Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and
Hubert L. Dreyfus, leaders consolidate the new mood and
its politics by establishing a new, simple, widely encountered,
signature practice that captivates people with a spooky sense
that it was always already invisibly present. This last block
requires more art than science.
We will look at each building block by drawing on four
companies whose leaders transformed one of the four nega-
tive structural moods into its positive counterpart. We
already introduced the medical services company. The others
are new.
GETTING INTO THE COUNTERPART MOOD AND
SEEING THE OLD POLITICS
The first building block is to get the senior team to see its
behavior from within the counterpart mood. Without this
experience, no leader will have the inner resources or man-
agement support to drive the change. Different techniques
work best for the different moods. In resentful companies,
outsiders can interview the senior team and then conduct a
workshop on the team’s behaviors in the mood of hope. In
fearful companies, leaders have their managers share posi-
tive and negative assessments of each other. The negative
show the politics; the positive elicit admiration. Resigned
teams get into the mood of zeal when they listen to candid
assessments from zealous, raving-fan customers. Arrogant
cultures generally require a combination of outsiders report-
ing and an exercise where the senior team joyfully experi-
ences its game-playing.
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viewed in Hope
At the medical services company riven by the high-growth
and culture-preservation factions, the high-growth CEO Mar-
tin had consultants interview his team. In a workshop, the
consultants quoted everyone anonymously confessing to
recent factional politicking. To incite hope, the consultants
respected the courage of speaking honestly and drew on
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s full
confession, full forgiveness. They assumed the team was
changing. The team caught the mood and momentarily
saw their factions as crude.
Retained IT: Fear’s Betrayals Viewed in
Admiration
In contrast, Luke, the chief information office (CIO) of a
retained IT division of a European investment bank, used
assessment sharing to get his team to notice their politics of
betrayal. Luke brought the managers of the retained and
outsourced IT departments into a workshop where he told
them to make three assessments of each of their colleagues—
one negative and two positive. Most feared they would never
be able to work together again, but each assessed his or her
colleagues in succession. Because the negative assessments
contained well-known small betrayals like ignoring a need for
help, managers felt relief. The admiring assessments sur-
prised gently. The combination of relief and surprise shifted
the mood. The mistreatments seemed old; the admiring
assessments were new. For a memorable moment, they
admired their colleagues.
Engineering Company: Resignation’s
Appeasement Viewed in Zeal
Harry, the new CEO of a global engineering company that
designed, built, and installed power plants, found himself
surrounded with engineering silos along with sales, market-
ing, and finance. All appeased each other while advancing
their own disciplines to create margin-destroying gold-plat-
ing. To get his senior team see themselves, Harry brought the
team in to hear raving-fan clients. The clients loved the
company’s brilliantly engineered power plants. When Harry
asked how things had changed recently, the customers said
that the engineers used to run seminars to answer their
questions. ‘‘Now, they try to appease us with short e-mails.’’
When the chief financial officer (CFO) apologetically men-
tioned cost, a client responded forcefully: ‘‘How do you
expect us to write RFPs suited to your engineering if you
don’t work with us?’’ The client’s zeal woke their own. They
felt shame at their transparent appeasing. They wanted to
give full answers.
Energy Company: Arrogance’s Deceit Viewed in
Joy
Oliver, the new CEO (former CFO) of a European energy
company, found himself over his head with his arrogant
company’s game-playing, deceitful senior managers. The
senior team made daring promises—doubling renewables,acquiring facilities at half the market price, cutting customer
churn by half— and then supplied brilliant reasons for miss-
ing. Oliver knew he was part of it, and it had to stop. He
turned attention to a failed foreign market penetration. He
asked consultants to investigate. The managers took pride in
their gamesmanship and gave a clear picture of their beha-
vior: ‘‘I promise X when I know I will deliver Y.’’ To encourage
a mood of joy, the consultants wrote a report that treated the
game playing as heroic. Still, the managers were nonplussed.
At the next management meeting, they boldly proposed
radical changes to prevent ‘‘ambitious’’ promises. One spoke
for hyper-rigorous numbers, another for non-executive direc-
tors attending management meetings. They were posturing.
Oliver and the consultants conducted an exercise. They asked
the managers to write down what they and their colleague on
the right would say about the next agenda item. Then they
went around the table, speaking in turn for the colleague.
Since the exercise appealed to their game playing, the
managers threw themselves into it. They mimicked their
colleagues’ styles and got the content mostly right. At the
end, as they basked in the joy of their performance, the
consultant asked what was different. ‘‘We normally play to
win,’’ one said. ‘‘Win what?’’ Oliver asked, showing the
insincere positions and game-playing.
These short moments of heightened awareness and desire
for change stiffen the leader’s resolve and reduce resistance.
STARTING TO MANAGE IN THE STYLE OF THE
COUNTERPART MOOD
The transformation proceeds if the leader cold-bloodedly
goes through the unnatural ‘‘outward motions’’ of establish-
ing a management practice that expresses the counterpart
mood and forces the leader’s own transformation. How? Karl
Weick writing on design and Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus
writing on innovation argue for finding the transformative
practice in the manager’s own past. A reflective discussion
with a coach does the job.
The coach asks the leader to tell the story of her manage-
rial life from school to the present. How did she manage
during her first appointment, her first career challenge, and
so on? How does or did she manage athletic teams, fellow
hobbyists, parishioners, or family members? Since the coun-
terpart is a subordinate mood in the negative one, leaders
will invariably have managed in it at least once.
Once the coach and leader find the moment, they resur-
rect a practice that will resolve a current problem and
manifest the counterpart mood’s politics. Because it draws
on an unusual way of behaving, the practice incites instinc-
tive resistance. The leader feels this resistance intensely, but
it shows that the practice brings with it the counterpart
mood. Martin Heidegger sees this moment as facing the death
of one’s identity and as critical to change. We will note each
leader’s unsettledness.
The Medical Services CEO Sets Up a Practice of
Hopeful Trust
In the space opened by the Truth and Reconciliation work-
shop, Martin recognized that he needed to build trust with
his own team and the board. In an earlier job, he trusted
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tion to hopeful trust, he asked his current team to identify
each other’s talents, and then he set a ground rule. Except
for vexed issues of growth and culture, the talented expert
would speak first and last on his issues. Martin felt weird
forcing the practice but persevered. His team assimilated it.
It cut the sniping and yielded brief experiences of non-
partisan trust.
The Retained IT CIO Sets Up a Practice of
Admiring Celebration
In the wake of the retained and outsourced IT assessment
exercise, Luke wondered how he could cut through the vague
reports from both teams. He remembered his days at a Silicon
Valley start up in the 1980s, when he and other managers
lived in admiration and celebrated colleagues’ achievements
at the pizza-and-beer Fridays. No one reported vaguely then.
People wanted to be celebrated. Luke started weekly out-
sourcer and retained IT project dinners. The local outsourced
managers nominated the retained IT manager of the week
and the retained IT managers did the same for the outsourced
team. Migrating from dinner to dinner, Luke modeled giving
thanks in the mood of admiration. The managers liked the
events, spoke crisply about achievements, but did no more.
Luke felt like a dinosaur, but persevered.
The Engineering Company CEO Sets Up a Practice
of Zealous Discipline
In light of the zealous customers’ remarks, Harry saw that he
needed a zealous company with a cross-silo discipline. He
managed with zeal at a previous company where he had led
project management. He reorganized to put project man-
agers in charge of each program from early in the sales cycle
to commissioning. Once on projects, all department people
reported to the project manager. Cycle time became the key
measure. But margins improved only slightly. Everyone still
instinctively appeased. Harry had a cross-silo discipline, but
only he had the zeal. Yet he felt himself a figure of a destiny
he knew would be fulfilled.
The Energy Company CEO Sets Up a Joyful
Improvisational Practice
In the light of the workshop where the team saw its game
playing, Oliver recalled a practice he had enjoyed from his
days as CFO, when he conducted chats with regional finance
teams over frugal Chinese dinners. He made no bold promises;
he listened to staff, talked about his concerns, and answered
questions. Those teams enjoyed his homespun approach and
would often improvise solutions for his concerns. He resur-
rected the practice in the form of town hall meetings with the
direct reports of his senior team. Oliver felt vulnerable in
returning to this seemingly weak part of his past, but persisted.
MAKING THE NEW PRACTICE AND MOOD
PERVASIVE
When a leader finds she can anticipate the daily challenges to
the uncomfortable new practice, it is time for the finalbuilding block. The leader’s art requires building on the
initial practice to make it both resilient against challenges
and available across the company. Though it always seems
like a marvel when it occurs, leaders tend to make this
happen in a few simple ways. Following Tamara Erickson
and Lynda Gratton, leaders can give their new practice
resilient teeth by using it as the only way to make certain
crucial decisions. For instance, all strategy setting proceeds
through the new practice. The leader can also establish
additional practices that support the new practice. Celebrat-
ing customers or suppliers, for example, supports celebrating
employees. To make the practice available, the leader can
simply increase the number of people who engage in it. Every
department has a morning huddle. Leaders frequently com-
bine these techniques. The enhanced practice takes on a life
of its own and creates perpetuators when it solves a key
problem, has the leader’s full authority behind it, and pro-
vokes a sense of enthusiasm. It reveals a behavior and feeling
(of the counterpart mood) that managers previously were
close to having.
The Medical Services CEO Makes Hopeful Trust
Pervasive
At the medical services company, Martin had created a new
way of working when it came to non-controversial issues. The
team easily gave Martin first and last word in anticipating the
next action of a competitor. Likewise, everyone trusted the
COO on execution. However, the board faction and COO still
opposed Martin’s acquisitions. Martin decided to give the new
trust-building practice sharp teeth with a supplement. Martin
asked the antagonistic board members to create a growth
assessment tool for determining cultural affinity, quality of
medical practices, and overall strategic fit. The request itself
required hopeful trust. Martin then publically promised to
use the tool in identifying acquisitions. The tool made expli-
cit many of the old tacit cultural assumptions of the board,
and debates reached resolution by turning on the use of the
tool, not anyone’s motivations. Marvelously the past, embo-
died in the tacit assumptions of the tool, resolved the pre-
sent’s problems.
The Retained IT CIO Makes Admiring Celebration
Pervasive
Since Luke’s celebratory dinners had no legs, Luke devised
two additional admiring practices to help managers identify
what to celebrate and inspire them to do so. He started each
project with a goals-sharing meeting. The retained and out-
sourced managers named their largest challenges and the
success they would like to achieve. To end casual finger-
pointing betrayals, he also established a weekly horse-trad-
ing meeting. There the retained and outsourced managers
admitted resourcing weaknesses and made requests for pro-
grammers, analysts, even personal assistants to ‘‘save’’ the
week. No one wanted to show any vulnerability, but as with
the assessment exercise, they ended up admiring each other.
As these two meetings lent substance to the celebratory
dinners, the dinners imbued the meetings with admiration.
Managers marveled at how the old skill for observing others’
weaknesses had become a skill for taking care of others.
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Harry made his new project management discipline incisive
by adding work freezes. He identified the times when addi-
tional costs crept into projects and stopped all work at each.
It shocked the appeasing culture. At each stoppage, all the
disciplines had to agree on a plan to save the margin before
restarting. Because Harry put all his authority behind the
freezes and no one wanted to be seen to be holding up the
whole program, the desire to get through the freezes became
zeal. Weirdly, when they looked back at their old back-and-
forth appeasing, managers saw they essentially had had
freezes.
The Energy Company CEO Makes Joyful
Improvisation Pervasive
Oliver wanted his town-hall practice to pervade the whole
company, but he could not order his senior team simply to
change their style. Then, one day, he had to prepare for a
meeting with a senior government minister and happened
onto the minister’s blog. It showed him what the minister
wanted. The day after he met the minister, Oliver started his
own internal company blog. He wrote in his casual, slightly
humorous style. Ninety percent of the company read itweekly. More important, his senior managers, who had
already shown themselves adept at imitating styles, started
using Oliver’s style in their correspondence and conversa-
tions. They started to make sensible offers to Oliver in his
style. They were staging themselves, as they always had
done. But now they shared in staging and felt the joy of
group improvisation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Today’s prescriptions for exercising power fail in the face of
costly, negative politics that normally resist anything short of
draconian terminations. Structural moods explain the sticki-
ness of negative and positive politics, and counterpart moods
show the way to transform negative structural moods without
mass terminations. The leader identifies the negative struc-
tural mood and gives her team an experience of their beha-
vior in the counterpart mood. That experience opens the
space for her to institute a practice that bears the counter-
part mood. She perseveres with it until challenges are pre-
dictable, and then she strengthens it and applies it to a
visible mission-critical activity.
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